Tullock Contest with Desert Concerns

19 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2023

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Abstract

We study the Tullock contest model with desert concerns (Gill and Stone (2010)). In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish the conditions necessary for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of desert concerns on players’ spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.

Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, asymmetry, desire to win, loss aversion

Suggested Citation

Fallucchi, Francesco and Trevisan, Francesco, Tullock Contest with Desert Concerns. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4593648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4593648

Francesco Fallucchi

University of Bergamo ( email )

Via Salvecchio, 19
Bergamo, 24129
Italy

LISER ( email )

11, Porte des Sciences
Campus Belval – Maison des Sciences Humaines
Esch-sur-Alzette, L-4366
Luxembourg

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