Chevron and Stare Decisis
George Mason Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 475-497, 2024
University of Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 24-010
C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State Research Paper No. Forthcoming
23 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2023 Last revised: 3 Apr 2024
Date Written: October 8, 2023
Abstract
In our contribution to this Chevron on Trial Symposium, we argue that the Supreme Court should not overrule Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and its companion case Relentless v. Department of Commerce. We based our argument largely on statutory stare decisis. In particular, Chevron deference is a bedrock precedent in administrative law, relied on by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts thousands of times since Chevron was decided in 1984. Congress, federal agencies, and the regulated public have also structured their affairs around the precedent. Conversely, the constitutional arguments against Chevron are unpersuasive, and the debate about the original understanding of judicial deference in the Administrative Procedure Act is murky at best. The doctrine of stare decisis, we submit, should be at its high point with respect to this statutory precedent.
Chevron deference, moreover, advances important rule-of-law values in administrative law. Aside from the conventional values of agency expertise, enhanced deliberative process, and more politically accountable policymaking, our empirical scholarship sheds light on two less-appreciated values: national uniformity and predictability in federal law and less politics in judicial decisionmaking. Finally, we argue, the Court’s recent approach to Chevron has already addressed the concerns raised about the precedent—i.e., through more searching inquiries at Chevron steps one and two and the introduction of the major questions doctrine.
Keywords: administrative law, Chevron, judicial deference, stare decisis
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