Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment

CEPR Discussion Paper Series 1428

Posted: 28 Jan 1997

See all articles by Gilles Saint-Paul

Gilles Saint-Paul

University of Toulouse I - GREMAQ-IDEI; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: June 1996

Abstract

This paper studies, in a model with unemployment, how labor market status affects the preferences for public spending, in the form of a public good or subsidies. It then derives the implications for the dynamics of government expenditures under the hypothesis of majority voting. These will exhibit positive persistence if the employed are marginally more powerful than the unemployed, and negative persistence if the unemployed are marginally more powerful. Under a uniform distribution of tastes for the public good, there is no persistence. The preferences of the unemployed may be non-single-peaked, so that high unemployment may destroy the existence of a voting equilibrium.

JEL Classification: E62, H2, H5, J6

Suggested Citation

Saint-Paul, Gilles, Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment (June 1996). CEPR Discussion Paper Series 1428. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4598

Gilles Saint-Paul (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse I - GREMAQ-IDEI ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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