Organizational Identity and Performance: An Inquiry into Nonconforming Company Names

Long Range Planning, Forthcoming

HEC Paris Research Paper No. SPE-2023-1495

47 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2023 Last revised: 25 Jan 2024

See all articles by Mario Daniele Amore

Mario Daniele Amore

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Mircea Epure

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona School of Economics; UPF Barcelona School of Management

Orsola Garofalo

Copenhagen Business School

Date Written: September 13, 2023

Abstract

Choosing the right company name is challenging and may have major consequences for firm prospects. Drawing on the strategic conformity literature, we investigate the implications of “nonconforming” company names, i.e. foreign sounding and family-unrelated, for family firms’ performance. Consistent with the idea that such names endow the business with greater visibility and recognition, we find that nonconforming names are positively associated with financial performance. This association is stronger when the firm operates in an industry with a low share of nonconforming peers and a high share of eponymous peers, in a crowded product class, and is smaller than industry peers. Collectively, our analysis provides new evidence on the strategic implications of company names.

Keywords: Organizational identity, company names, family firms, performance

JEL Classification: G30, M10, M14

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Epure, Mircea and Garofalo, Orsola, Organizational Identity and Performance: An Inquiry into Nonconforming Company Names (September 13, 2023). Long Range Planning, Forthcoming, HEC Paris Research Paper No. SPE-2023-1495, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4599161 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4599161

Mario Daniele Amore

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Mircea Epure (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://mirceaepure.com

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

UPF Barcelona School of Management ( email )

Carrer de Balmes, 132, 134
Barcelona, 08008
Spain

Orsola Garofalo

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

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