The last temptation: Is group-based voting resilient to pivotal considerations?

22 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2023

See all articles by Nikolas Tsakas

Nikolas Tsakas

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: October 6, 2023

Abstract

Group-based reasoning asserts that a voter will adopt the strategy that maximizes their payoff, assuming that this strategy will also be employed by all voters of their type. In this paper, we examine a general model involving multiple candidates and voter types, and we demonstrate that, in mandatory or costless elections, group-based voting remains resilient to pivotal considerations (i.e. the impulse to deviate from the strategy that maximizes the group's payoffs in favor of one's own payoff). This finding strengthens the connection between two important theories on voting behavior —group-based reasoning and individual utility maximization— and highlights that they do not always produce starkly different predictions.

Keywords: ethical voting, pivotal voter, strategic voting, multicandidate elections.

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Tsakas, Nikolas and Xefteris, Dimitrios, The last temptation: Is group-based voting resilient to pivotal considerations? (October 6, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4601328 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4601328

Nikolas Tsakas (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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