47 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2003
Date Written: October 2003
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation models and subject the models to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find that the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data also provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals' propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, stochastic stability, imitation, Cournot markets, experiments
JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D43, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Apesteguia, Jose and Huck, Steffen and Oechssler, Joerg, Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence (October 2003). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1049. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=460141