Linear or Non-Linear? A Cooperative Game Theory Perspective for Weapon System Contribution Rate Evaluation

Abstract

System contribution rate evaluation plays a key role in new weapon development project demonstration. Because the priority of potentially developed weapons depends on the contribution rate of the weapon to the effectiveness of the Combat System of Systems (CSoS). However, previous research has largely ignored the emergent, and non-linear characteristics of the CSoS brought on by cooperation and complex interactions among its component systems. To fill this gap, this work aims to construct a novel cooperative game theory framework for contribution rate evaluation, which regards component systems in the CSoS as players in a game. Consequently, this original problem is transferred to payoffs (i.e., CSoS effectiveness) allocation issues. Then, the Shapley value-based contribution rate evaluation method is proposed. Besides, the negotiated solution-based evaluation method is created, which requires fewer data than the former method. Finally, the efficacy of the proposed methods is demonstrated using the contribution rate evaluation of new weapons in an air defense system. The evaluation results will give decision-makers a comprehensive understanding of the contribution of new weapons and support the selection of suitable new weapons with a high contribution rate.

Keywords: combat system of systems, contribution rate evaluation, Cooperative Game, Shapley value, negotiated solution