A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for the Public Finances of Globalized Economies

Abstract

In line with the capital structure irrelevance principle of Modigliani and Miller (1958), this article shows that when international capital allocation choices are determined by well-informed, deep-pocketed global financial investors, there are no net gains a government of a highly internationally financially integrated (“globalized”) economy can consistently extract from resorting to one type of deficit financing (say, debt) versus another (say, money) or by issuing debt in one form versus another. The article proves a new Neutrality Theorem whereby, in a globalized economy the cost of the capital needed by governments to finance their deficits is independent of whether: i) financing originates from debt or money, ii) debt is denominated in domestic or foreign currency, and iii) money and debt are issued under floating or fixed exchange rates. The theorem’s two corollaries show that governments seeking to monetize their deficits must remunerate money holdings with a real return that varies inversely with credibility and directly with the stock of money The article points to areas for future research.

Keywords: capital structure, credibility, debt and equity, investors, irrelevance and neutrality, money