Existence and Persistence: On the Double Role of Aristotelian Forms

Abstract

Hylemorphism is the view that objects are – in some sense – compounds of matter and form. Principle-based hylemorphism is the view that forms are principles of unity. In this paper I want to rise a challenge to contemporary versions of principle-based hylemorphism. The challenge emerges from two assumptions that are commonly acknowledged by principle-based hylemorphists. First, each object has, associated with its sort, certain persistence conditions. Second, for an object to be of a particular sort is for it to have a particular (kind of) form. It follows that there is an intimate relationship between an object’s form and its persistence conditions. The challenge for the principle-based hylemorphist is to provide a satisfactory explanation of this relationship. What it needs to answer this challenge depends in part on what persistence conditions are. According to a common understanding, persistence conditions are something like conditions of temporal composition. If this understanding were correct, the standard principle-based hylemorphist could meet the challenge quite easily. I argue, however, that this understanding is not correct. Persistence conditions are not conditions of temporal composition, but conditions of staying in existence. It turns out that, with this understanding in place, standard versions of principle-based hylemorphism are incapable of explaining persistence conditions. However, instead of rejecting principle-based hylemorphism, I suggest a modification that allows to give the required explanation. We should distinguish between two layers of forms: a principle of existence and a principle of persistence. While the former is associated with the object’s existence conditions, the latter provides the object with its persistence conditions.

Keywords: Hylemorphism, form, persistence, essence