A Model of R&D Valuation and the Design of Research Incentives

65 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2003  

Jason C. Hsu

Rayliant Global Advisors; Research Affiliates, LLC; University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Business

Eduardo S. Schwartz

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2003

Abstract

We develop a real options model of R&D valuation, which takes into account the uncertainty in the quality of the research output, the time and cost to completion, and the market demand for the R&D output. The model is then applied to study the problem of pharmaceutical under-investment in R&D for vaccines to treat diseases affecting the developing regions of the world. To address this issue, world organizations and private foundations are willing to sponsor vaccine R&D, but there is no consensus on how to administer the sponsorship effectively. Different research incentive contracts are examined using our valuation model. Their effectiveness is measured in the following four dimensions: cost to the sponsor, the probability of development success, the consumer surplus generated and the expected cost per person successfully vaccinated. We find that, in general, purchase commitment plans (pull subsidies) are more effective than cost subsidy plans (push subsidies), while extending patent protection is completely ineffective. Specifically, we find that a hybrid subsidy constructed from a purchase commitment combined with a sponsor co-payment feature produces the best results in all four dimensions of the effectiveness measure.

Suggested Citation

Hsu, Jason C. and Schwartz, Eduardo S., A Model of R&D Valuation and the Design of Research Incentives (October 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w10041. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=461362

Jason C. Hsu

Rayliant Global Advisors ( email )

Hong Kong

Research Affiliates, LLC ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.jasonhsu.org

University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Business

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Eduardo S. Schwartz (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-1953 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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