Compromising Welfare

24 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2023

See all articles by Deniz Okat

Deniz Okat

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

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Abstract

The U.S. Constitution includes many checks and balances that necessitate the ruling party to compromise with the opposition. Using data of the nominations of federal judges from 1989 to 2014 and controlling for each candidate’s competence with the rating assigned by the American Bar Association, I show that the confirmation in the Senate is more likely and faster when the President nominates an older individual. Because federal judges are appointed for life, appointments of competent younger judges extend the productive period they spend on the bench and improve welfare. Therefore, my findings suggest that the system of checks and balances comes with a price.

Keywords: D72, D74, K00

Suggested Citation

Okat, Deniz, Compromising Welfare. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4614079 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4614079

Deniz Okat (Contact Author)

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

Clearwater Bay
Kowloon, 999999
Hong Kong

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