Democratic Public Good Provision

39 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2003

See all articles by John Hassler

John Hassler

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Kjetil Storesletten

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fabrizio Zilibotti

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Yale University

Date Written: September 2003

Abstract

This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast the political equilibria with the Ramsey allocation, and analyse the sources of inefficiency. The political equilibria can feature both under- and over-provision of public good, as well an inefficient life-cycle profile of taxes.

Keywords: Markov equilibrium, multiple equilibria, public good, political economy, Ramsey allocation, taxation

JEL Classification: D72, D78, E62, H21, H41, H53

Suggested Citation

Hassler, John and Storesletten, Kjetil and Zilibotti, Fabrizio and Zilibotti, Fabrizio, Democratic Public Good Provision (September 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=461623

John Hassler (Contact Author)

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden
+46 816 2070 (Phone)
+46 816 1443 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Kjetil Storesletten

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+47 2284 4009 (Phone)
+47 2285 5035 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://folk.uio.no/kjstore/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Fabrizio Zilibotti

Yale University ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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