Law or Authority: How Penal Elites Shape Sentencing Policy by Non-Binding Interventions

56 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2023

See all articles by Jakub Drápal

Jakub Drápal

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Law; Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic - Institute of State and Law; Leiden University

Libor Dusek

Charles University, Faculty of Law; University of Economics, Prague

Date Written: October 31, 2023

Abstract

We investigate the causal effects of non-binding sentencing policy recommendations made by top-level penal authorities within the limits of existing legislation. The Supreme Prosecutor and the President of the Supreme Court in Czechia ran a campaign aimed to increase the imposition of fines in criminal sentencing. The campaign consisted of policy meetings with chief prosecutors and seminars for judges and prosecutors. The meetings with the chief prosecutors increased the probability of a fine being imposed by 7 percentage points, while judges who participated in campaign seminars were 6 percentage points more likely to impose a fine afterwards. These interventions had heterogeneous effects both at the court and judge levels. The increased imposition of fines substituted for suspended prison sentences.

Keywords: sentencing, fines, penal policy, criminal policy, sentencing disparities, authority

JEL Classification: K14

Suggested Citation

Drápal, Jakub and Dusek, Libor, Law or Authority: How Penal Elites Shape Sentencing Policy by Non-Binding Interventions (October 31, 2023). Charles University in Prague Faculty of Law Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4619030 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4619030

Jakub Drápal (Contact Author)

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Law ( email )

Prague
Czech Republic

Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic - Institute of State and Law ( email )

Národní 18
Praha 1, 11600
Czech Republic

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, Zuid Holland 2300 RA
Netherlands

Libor Dusek

Charles University, Faculty of Law ( email )

nam. Curieovych 7
Prague 1, 11640
Czech Republic

University of Economics, Prague ( email )

nam. W.Churchilla 4
Prague 3, 130 67
Czech Republic

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