Law or Authority: How Penal Elites Shape Sentencing Policy by Non-Binding Interventions

Abstract

We investigate the causal effects of non-binding sentencing policy recommendations made by top-level penal authorities within the limits of existing legislation. The Supreme Prosecutor and the President of the Supreme Court in Czechia ran a campaign aimed to increase the imposition of fines in criminal sentencing. The campaign consisted of policy meetings with chief prosecutors and seminars for judges and prosecutors. The meetings with the chief prosecutors increased the probability of a fine being imposed by 7 percentage points, while judges who participated in campaign seminars were 6 percentage points more likely to impose a fine afterwards. These interventions had heterogeneous effects both at the court and judge levels. The increased imposition of fines substituted for suspended prison sentences.

Keywords: sentencing, fines, penal policy, criminal policy, sentencing disparities, authority

JEL Classification: K14