Voting and Nonlinear Taxes in a Stylized Representative Democracy

53 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2003

See all articles by Henning Bohn

Henning Bohn

University of California, Santa Barbara; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Charles Stuart

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 2003

Abstract

We derive median-voter results and study the shape of redistributional taxes when voters elect a candidate who imposes taxes to maximize own utility. Under general conditions, a median-productivity candidate is a Condorcet winner. The imposed tax function is non-linear, may place high marginal rates on very low incomes, and may have an interval of negative marginal rates below the income of the winning candidate. Marginal rates are positive throughout, however, if non-redistributional spending or altruism toward the poor are great enough.

JEL Classification: D7, H2

Suggested Citation

Bohn, Henning and Stuart, Charles, Voting and Nonlinear Taxes in a Stylized Representative Democracy (October 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=462428 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.462428

Henning Bohn (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara ( email )

Department of Economics
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
805-893-4532 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Charles Stuart

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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