The Rapid Response Labor Mechanism of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement

35 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2023

See all articles by Chad P. Bown

Chad P. Bown

Peterson Institute for International Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kathleen Claussen

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: October 12, 2023

Abstract

The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) introduced a new compliance institution for labor rights in trade agreements: the facility-specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM). The RRM was developed to tackle one particular thorn in the side of North American integration—labor rights for Mexican workers—which had had detrimental, long-term political-economic consequences for the two countries’ trade relationship. This paper reviews the unique political-economic moment in the United States and Mexico that prompted the creation of this tool. It describes how the RRM works and the considerable financial and human resources the two governments have brought to bear to operationalize it. The paper then reports a number of stylized facts on how governments used the RRM during its first three years, largely in the auto sector. It proposes paths of potentially fruitful political-economic research to understand the full implications of the RRM and concludes with preliminary lessons as well as a discussion of the potential for policymakers to transpose facility-specific mechanisms for labor or other issues, such as the environment, into future economic agreements.

Keywords: USMCA, RRM, labor, auto industry, unions, collective bargaining, dispute resolution

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Bown, Chad P. and Claussen, Kathleen, The Rapid Response Labor Mechanism of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (October 12, 2023). Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 23-9, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4627560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4627560

Chad P. Bown (Contact Author)

Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Kathleen Claussen

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

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