Gains from Reassignment: Evidence from a Two-Sided Teacher Market

44 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2023

See all articles by Mariana Laverde

Mariana Laverde

Boston College

Elton Mykerezi

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities

Aaron Sojourner

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; University of Minnesota; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Aradhya Sood

University of Toronto

Date Written: November 9, 2023


Although the literature on assignment mechanisms emphasizes the importance of efficiency based on agents' preferences, policymakers may want to achieve different goals. For instance, school districts may want to affect student learning outcomes but must take teacher welfare into account when assigning teachers to students in classrooms and schools. This paper studies both the potential efficiency and equity test-score gains from within-district reassignment of teachers to classrooms using novel data that allows us to observe decisions of both teachers and principals in the teacher internal-transfer process, and test-scores of students from the observed assignments. We jointly model student achievement and teacher and school principal decisions to account for potential selection on test-score gains and to predict teacher effectiveness in unobserved matches. Teachers, but not principals, are averse to assignment based on the teachers' comparative advantage. Estimates from counterfactual assignments of teachers to classrooms imply that, under a constraint not to reduce any retained teacher's welfare, average student test scores could rise by 7% of a standard deviation with a centralized assignment mechanism. Although both high and low achievers would experience average gains under this counterfactual, gains would be larger for high-achieving students.

Suggested Citation

Laverde, Mariana and Mykerezi, Elton and Sojourner, Aaron J. and Sood, Aradhya, Gains from Reassignment: Evidence from a Two-Sided Teacher Market (November 9, 2023). Available at SSRN: or

Mariana Laverde

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Elton Mykerezi

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities ( email )

420 Delaware St. SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Aaron J. Sojourner

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ( email )

300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
United States

University of Minnesota

Carlson School of Management
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072

Aradhya Sood (Contact Author)

University of Toronto ( email )

105 St George St
Toronto, ON M5S 3E6
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6

HOME PAGE: http://

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics