A Framework for Geoeconomics

70 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2023 Last revised: 12 Jan 2025

See all articles by Christopher Clayton

Christopher Clayton

Yale School of Management

Matteo Maggiori

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Jesse Schreger

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 2023

Abstract

Governments use their countries’ economic strength from financial and trade relationships to achieve geopolitical and economic goals. We provide a model of the sources of geoeconomic power and how it is wielded. The source of this power is the ability of a hegemonic country to coordinate threats across disparate economic relationships as a mean of enforcement on foreign entities. The hegemon wields this power to demand costly actions out of the targeted entities, including mark-ups, import restrictions, tariffs, and political concessions. The hegemon uses its power to change targeted entities’ activities to manipulate the global equilibrium in its favor and increase its power. A sector is strategic either in helping the hegemon form threats or in manipulating the world equilibrium via input-output amplification. The hegemon acts a global enforcer, thus adding value to the world economy, but destroys value by distorting the equilibrium in its favor.

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Suggested Citation

Clayton, Christopher and Maggiori, Matteo and Schreger, Jesse, A Framework for Geoeconomics (November 2023). NBER Working Paper No. w31852, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4631016

Christopher Clayton (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Ave
New Haven, CT 06511

Matteo Maggiori

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, 94305
United States

Jesse Schreger

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Economics ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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