Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina

38 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2003 Last revised: 7 Aug 2009

See all articles by Andres A. Gallo

Andres A. Gallo

University of North Florida - Dept. of Economics

Lee J. Alston

Indiana University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 5, 2009

Abstract

The future looked bright for Argentina in the early twentieth century. It had already achieved high levels of income per capita and was moving away from authoritarian government towards a more open democracy. Unfortunately, Argentina never finished the transition. The turning point occurred in the 1930s when to stay in power, the Conservatives in the Pampas resorted to electoral fraud, which neither the legislative, executive, or judicial branches checked. The decade of unchecked electoral fraud led to the support for Juan Peron and subsequently to political and economic instability.

JEL Classification: O13, O54, P16, P17, Q15, N16, N46, N56, K11

Suggested Citation

Gallo, Andres and Alston, Lee J., Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina (August 5, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=463300 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.463300

Andres Gallo (Contact Author)

University of North Florida - Dept. of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics and Geography
1 UNF Drive
Jacksonville, FL 32224-2675
United States
904-620-1694 (Phone)
904-620-1300 (Fax)

Lee J. Alston

Indiana University ( email )

Wylie Hall
100 South Woodlawn
Bloomington, IN 47408–3895
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.indiana.edu/about/faculty/alston-lee.html

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
618
Abstract Views
4,487
rank
50,388
PlumX Metrics