Responsive Competition Law Enforcement: Lessons from the Greek Competition Authority

40 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2023

See all articles by Stavros Makris

Stavros Makris

University of Glasgow, School of Law; LSE Law; Wageningen Universtiy; European University Institute, Department of Law (LAW); SciencesPo - Sciences po Paris Law School

Date Written: November 19, 2023

Abstract

According to the conventional view competition law differs from regulation in that it is applied ex
post, through proscriptions, and in a ‘crime-tort’ fashion. From this angle, when competition
enforcers intervene ex ante, in a prophylactic manner, and employ prescriptive tools, they
inappropriately transform competition law into ‘regulatory antitrust’. The present study challenges
this view arguing that modern competition law intervention has moved beyond the crime-tort
enforcement model and aspires to be ‘responsive’. This means that modern enforcers intervene
ex ante and ex post, use prescriptive and proscriptive tools, and impose restorative and
prophylactic remedies to ensure that the law is applied effectively. The works of the Greek
Competition Authority offer a case study to illustrate this point. This authority has been
utilizing a plurality of tools and enforcement strategies to enhance compliance and deterrence
and apply the law responsively. However, enforcement that aspires to be responsive may create
problems of over-enforcement or under-enforcement, be vulnerable to regulatory failures, or
undermine Rule-of-Law principles. For this reason, this study draws on responsive regulation
theory to make fourteen recommendations on how to address these challenges and ensure truly
responsive enforcement.

Keywords: Competition law, enforcement, remedies, regulation, regulatory theory, competition policy

JEL Classification: A11, A12, A13, B40, B21, B41, K00, K21, K40, K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Makris, Stavros, Responsive Competition Law Enforcement: Lessons from the Greek Competition Authority (November 19, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4637986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4637986

Stavros Makris (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow, School of Law ( email )

Stair Building
5-10 The Square
Glasgow, G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

LSE Law ( email )

United Kingdom

Wageningen Universtiy ( email )

Netherlands

European University Institute, Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Boccaccio 121 (Villa Schifanoia)
Firenze
Italy

SciencesPo - Sciences po Paris Law School ( email )

13 rue de l'université
Reims, 75007
France

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