Competition and Collusion in Two-Sided Markets with an Outside Option

60 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2023

See all articles by Cristian Chica

Cristian Chica

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis - School of Mathematics

Yinglong Guo

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis - School of Mathematics

Gilad Lerman

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis - School of Mathematics

Abstract

We introduce pricing formulas for competition and collusion models of two-sided markets with an outside option. For the competition model, we find conditions under which prices and consumer surplus may increase or decrease if the outside option utility increases. Therefore, neglecting the outside option can lead to either overestimation or underestimation of these equilibrium outputs. Comparing collusion to competition, we find that in cases of small cross-side externalities, collusion results in decreased normalized net deterministic utilities, reduced market participation and increased price, on both sides of the market. Additionally, we observe that as the number of platforms increases in the competition model, market participation rises. Profits, however, decrease when the net normalized deterministic utility is sufficiently low but increase when it is high. Furthermore, we identify specific conditions that quantify the change of price and consumer surplus when the competition increases.

Keywords: Competition, Collusion, Outside Option, Two-sided Markets, Externalities

Suggested Citation

Chica, Cristian and Guo, Yinglong and Lerman, Gilad, Competition and Collusion in Two-Sided Markets with an Outside Option. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4641282 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4641282

Cristian Chica

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis - School of Mathematics ( email )

Yinglong Guo

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis - School of Mathematics ( email )

Gilad Lerman (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis - School of Mathematics ( email )

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