The Welfare Benefits of Pay-As-You-Go Financing

70 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2023

See all articles by Paul Gertler

Paul Gertler

University of California, Berkeley

Brett Green

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Renping Li

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

David Alexandre Sraer

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: November 22, 2023

Abstract

Pay-as-you-go (PAYGo) financing is a novel financial contract that has recently become a popular form of credit, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). PAYGo financing relies on technology that enables the lender to cheaply and remotely disable the flow benefits of collateral when the borrower misses payments. This paper quantifies the welfare implications of PAYGo financing. We develop a dynamic structural model of consumers and estimate the model using a multi-arm, large scale pricing experiment conducted by a fintech lender that offers PAYGo financing for smartphones. We find that the welfare gain from access to PAYGo financing is equivalent to a 5.8% increase in income while remaining highly profitable for the lender. The welfare gains are larger for low-risk and intermediate-income consumers. Under reasonable assumptions about the repossession technology, PAYGo financing consistently outperforms traditional secured loans. For riskier consumers, an intermediate degree of lockout can be welfare maximizing.

Keywords: FinTech, Collateral, Lockout, Consumer Credit, Maturity Choice, Technology Adoption

JEL Classification: G21, G23, D14, D86

Suggested Citation

Gertler, Paul and Green, Brett and Li, Renping and Sraer, David Alexandre, The Welfare Benefits of Pay-As-You-Go Financing (November 22, 2023). Olin Business School Center for Finance & Accounting Research Paper No. 2023/15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4641559 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4641559

Paul Gertler

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

CA
United States

Brett Green (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Renping Li

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

David Alexandre Sraer

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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