Federal Tax Policy and the Capitalization of Local Public Goods

57 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2023 Last revised: 7 May 2024

See all articles by Brent W. Ambrose

Brent W. Ambrose

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Insurance & Real Estate

Maxence Valentin

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology and Economics

Date Written: October 10, 2024

Abstract

This study examines the connection between federal tax policies, particularly the deduction of State and Local Taxes (SALT), and the capitalization of local public goods into housing prices. In the United States, taxpayers can deduct taxes paid to local jurisdictions from their federal taxable incomes, effectively reducing the net cost of local public goods. We develop a theoretical model of local public goods capitalization that predicts a higher capitalization of public goods in jurisdictions with a greater share of residents who deduct taxes. We test this prediction using cross-sectional and temporal variations in deductions and school district spending and find empirical support that a higher share of residents deducting property taxes relates to a greater capitalization of local public spending. In particular, a one-standard deviation increase in school spending corresponds to a 3.7% decrease in house value in school districts where no resident deducts property taxes but to a 1.4% rise in values in districts where 25% % of the residents take advantage of the property tax deduction. Our results thus emphasize the importance of the interaction between local and national policies when evaluating the optimal level of local public good provisions.

Keywords: Capitalization of Public Goods, Local Public Finance, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Deductions, Property taxes, TCJA

JEL Classification: H71, H41, H21, R21

Suggested Citation

Ambrose, Brent W. and Valentin, Maxence, Federal Tax Policy and the Capitalization of Local Public Goods (October 10, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4649220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4649220

Brent W. Ambrose

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Insurance & Real Estate ( email )

Smeal College of Business,
Penn State University
University Park, PA US-0-PA 16802
United States
8148670066 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.psu.edu/brentwambrose/

Maxence Valentin (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology and Economics ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

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