Court-Packing and Judicial Manipulation

84 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2023 Last revised: 18 Apr 2024

See all articles by Justin T Callais

Justin T Callais

Archbridge Institute

Gor Mkrtchian

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: December 2, 2023

Abstract

Judicial independence is a fundamental pillar of a liberal democracy. In one of its most basic functions, judicial independence impedes the ability to engage in executive overreach. Judicial manipulation, particularly the infamous practice of court-packing, threatens this pillar. Court-packing and other forms of judicial manipulation can exacerbate executive corruption and worsen government accountability and the rule of law. Using synthetic control analyses, we examine three countries (Hungary, Poland, and Turkey) that recently implemented waves of judicial manipulation that included outright court-packing. Our results provide evidence that in every case, executive corruption worsens and scores on accountability and rule of law decrease relative to the counterfactual. Furthermore, the gap between the de jure constitutional provisions and the actual de facto practice of those provisions (constitutional compliance) widens. In each case, these results are large in magnitude and almost always statistically significant.

Suggested Citation

Callais, Justin and Mkrtchian, Gor, Court-Packing and Judicial Manipulation (December 2, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4651262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4651262

Justin Callais (Contact Author)

Archbridge Institute ( email )

1367 Connecticut Ave NW
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Washington DC, DC 20036
United States

Gor Mkrtchian

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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