Propagation of Climate Disasters Through Ownership Networks

96 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2023 Last revised: 10 Nov 2024

See all articles by Matthew Gustafson

Matthew Gustafson

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business

Ai He

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business

Ugur Lel

University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Zhongling Qin

Auburn University - Department of Finance

Date Written: November 19, 2022

Abstract

Institutional investors holding firms hit by climate-related disasters vote more in favor of climate-related shareholder proposals at their other portfolio firms. This relation arises via investors becoming more active voters on climate-related proposals and is strongest following recent exposure to large value-relevant disasters, during periods of elevated attention to climate risks, and for votes occurring at carbon-intensive firms. Aggregating to the firm level, firms with impacted investors exhibit lower climate change sentiment on conference calls and a longer-term decrease in emissions. Thus, climate disasters ripple through ownership networks to influence corporate behavior toward environmental responsibility.

JEL Classification: G11, Q54, M14, G3

Suggested Citation

Gustafson, Matthew and He, Ai and Lel, Ugur and Qin, Zhongling, Propagation of Climate Disasters Through Ownership Networks (November 19, 2022). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 941/2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4652225 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4652225

Matthew Gustafson

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business ( email )

East Park Avenue
University Park, PA 16802
United States

Ai He

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business ( email )

1014 Greene Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.aihefinance.com/

Ugur Lel (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Zhongling Qin

Auburn University - Department of Finance ( email )

Harbert College of Business
Auburn, AL 36849
United States

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