Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration

41 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2003

See all articles by Amihai Glazer

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Vesa Kanniainen

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Panu Poutvaara

University of Helsinki - Department of Economics; Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogeneous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the rich to reduce rents earned by absentee landlords. When the rich are mobile, a tax on them induces little migration because the tax will reduce the rents on land inhabited by the rich. A race to the bottom need not appear.

Keywords: taxes, land rents, property values, migration, redistribution

JEL Classification: H21, H7 R21, R23

Suggested Citation

Glazer, Amihai and Kanniainen, Vesa and Poutvaara, Panu, Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration (November 2003). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1075. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=466083

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-854-6563 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)

Vesa Kanniainen

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
+358-0-9-1911 (Phone)
+358-0-191-8877 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Panu Poutvaara (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland

HOME PAGE: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/poutvaar/

Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER) ( email )

FI-00014 Helsinki
Finland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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