Prices Versus Quantities: The Political Perspective

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 105, No. 1, February 1997

Posted: 19 Feb 1997

See all articles by Israel Finkelshtain

Israel Finkelshtain

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Yoav Kislev

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract

Regulation regimes subject to the influence of interest groups are compared. It is shown that the allocation of the regulated commodity varies with the implemented control and that the advantage of prices (vs. quotas) increases with the elasticity of the demand for or the supply of the commodity and decreases with the number of organized producers in the regulated industry. Control regimes can be ranked for negative, but not positive, externalities. Finally, a control regime leading to a more efficient commodity allocation also entails using fewer resources in rent-seeking activities.

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D78, D61, L5

Suggested Citation

Finkelshtain, Israel and Kislev, Yoav, Prices Versus Quantities: The Political Perspective. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 105, No. 1, February 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4664

Israel Finkelshtain

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem 91905, Jerusalem 91905
Israel
+08-9489255 (Phone)

Yoav Kislev (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Faculty of Agriculture
Jerusalem 91905
Israel
972-8-481-230 (Phone)
972-8-466-267 (Fax)

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