The Global Dash for Cash: Why Sovereign Bond Market Functioning Varied Across Jurisdictions in March 2020

31 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2023

See all articles by Jordan Barone

Jordan Barone

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Alain Chaboud

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Adam M. Copeland

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Cullen Kavoussi

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Frank M. Keane

Independent

Seth Searls

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2023

Abstract

In March 2020, the economic disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic prompted a global dash for cash by investors. This selling pressure occurred across advanced-economy sovereign bond markets and caused a deterioration in market functioning, leading to central bank interventions. The authors show that these market disruptions occurred disproportionately in the U.S. Treasury market and were due to investors’ selling pressures being far more pronounced and broad-based. Furthermore, the authors assess differences in key drivers of the market disruptions across sovereign bond markets, based on an analysis of the data as well as outreach to a range of market participants.

Keywords: sovereign bond markets, financial crisis, COVID-19

JEL Classification: G01, G12, E44, H63

Suggested Citation

Barone, Jordan and Chaboud, Alain and Copeland, Adam M. and Kavoussi, Cullen and Keane, Frank M. and Searls, Seth, The Global Dash for Cash: Why Sovereign Bond Market Functioning Varied Across Jurisdictions in March 2020 (December 2023). Economic Policy Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1-29, https://doi.org/10.59576/epr.29.3.1-29, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4666247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4666247

Jordan Barone

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Alain Chaboud

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
(202) 452 3756 (Phone)

Adam M. Copeland (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Cullen Kavoussi

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Frank M. Keane

Independent ( email )

Seth Searls

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ( email )

2200 North Pearl Street
PO Box 655906
Dallas, TX 75265-5906
United States

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