Subsidies control and enforcement

Forthcoming in Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit. Volume V: The Trade & Cooperation Agreement (Oxford University Press 2024)

Brexit Institute Working Paper Series No 10/2023

13 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2024

See all articles by Andrea Biondi

Andrea Biondi

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law

Date Written: December 19, 2023

Abstract

This contribution assesses how effective subsides control under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement is in preserving a level playing field between the EU and UK. It argues that in many respects subsidies regulation in the TCA goes further than what is usually required in international trade agreements by promoting regulation in ways that are the least damaging to competition. This is so if the principles under which a subsidy can be considered as unlawful or regulation of fiscal measures are taken into account. Further the remedies available in cases of non-enforcement are particularly wide: from the state-to-state remedies, to private enforcement, to the possible use of rebalancing measures. The new domestic system of subsidies control adopted by the UK, is also examined in terms of its compliance with TCA requirements.

Keywords: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Fiscal Subsidies, Level Playing Field, Private Enforcement of Subsidies Control, Subsidies, Trade & Cooperation Agreement

Suggested Citation

Biondi, Andrea, Subsidies control and enforcement (December 19, 2023). Forthcoming in Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit. Volume V: The Trade & Cooperation Agreement (Oxford University Press 2024), Brexit Institute Working Paper Series No 10/2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4669437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4669437

Andrea Biondi (Contact Author)

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law ( email )

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

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