Competition and Execution Quality in the Market for Retail Trading

65 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2023 Last revised: 13 Apr 2024

See all articles by Kee H. Chung

Kee H. Chung

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management

Dominik Rösch

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management

Yuhan Zhang

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management

Date Written: December 19, 2023

Abstract

Retail orders executed off-exchange have worse execution quality than those executed on-exchange and non-retail trades. Retail transaction costs are higher off-exchange by one basis point, increasing costs by more than one billion dollars. Using data during the Tick Size Pilot, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the NYSE floor closure, we show that retail traders benefit from increased price improvements on- but not off-exchange when liquidity providers’ rents or adverse selection risks are high. These results suggest that internalizers have market power and extract rents from retail orders. The market for retail trading is not as competitive as it could be.

Keywords: Market microstructure, Market quality, Retail trading, Trading floor, COVID-19, Tick Size Pilot, Bid-ask spreads, Price impact, Price improvement

JEL Classification: G10, G14, G18

Suggested Citation

Chung, Kee H. and Rösch, Dominik and Zhang, Yuhan, Competition and Execution Quality in the Market for Retail Trading (December 19, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4669930 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4669930

Kee H. Chung (Contact Author)

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

Buffalo, NY 14260
United States
716-645-3262 (Phone)
716-645-3823 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mgt.buffalo.edu/faculty/academic-departments/finance/faculty/kee-chung.html

Dominik Rösch

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14222
United States

HOME PAGE: http://dominikroesch.com

Yuhan Zhang

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management ( email )

255 Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14260
United States

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