Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments

MPIEW, Jena, Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction No. 13-2003

44 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2004

See all articles by Giorgio Coricelli

Giorgio Coricelli

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Dietmar Fehr

Heidelberg University - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics

Date Written: September 2003

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher contributions in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary valuation of being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.

Keywords: public goods, partner selection, experiments

JEL Classification: C91, D62, H41

Suggested Citation

Coricelli, Giorgio and Fehr, Dietmar and Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (September 2003). MPIEW, Jena, Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction No. 13-2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=467021 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.467021

Giorgio Coricelli (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://dornsife.usc.edu/coricelli/

Dietmar Fehr

Heidelberg University - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics ( email )

Helmholzstrasse
Ulm, D-89081
Germany

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