Impact, Inspiration, or Image: On the Trade-Offs in Pro-Environmental Behaviors 

39 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2023 Last revised: 27 Mar 2024

See all articles by Raisa Sherif

Raisa Sherif

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Sven A. Simon

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: December 21, 2023

Abstract

Today’s environmental challenges prompt individuals to take personal actions, though motivations vary. This paper presents causal evidence of a trade-off between two motivations behind pro-environmental behaviors (PEBs): maximizing environmental impact or being seen as green. In an experiment on voluntary carbon offsetting, we first isolate each motivation and quantify their impact. We then investigate whether individuals deliberately trade-off impact for the visibility of their actions, and why they do so. Our results show that while individuals respond to salient differences in efficiency and visibility, visible PEBs crowd out efficient alternatives, indicating a preference for being seen as green over actual environmental impact. We disentangle two motivations driving this preference for visible actions: social image concerns and role model aspirations. Role model aspirations exert a stronger influence, leading individuals to choose visible PEBs over efficient ones more frequently.

Keywords: Pro-environmental behavior, Efficiency, Visibility, Green preferences, Online experiment

JEL Classification: C90, D90, Q50

Suggested Citation

Sherif, Raisa and Simon, Sven A., Impact, Inspiration, or Image: On the Trade-Offs in Pro-Environmental Behaviors  (December 21, 2023). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2023-27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4672097 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4672097

Raisa Sherif

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Sven A. Simon (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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