On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries

WZB Discussion Paper No. FS IV 02-07

43 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2003

See all articles by Tomaso Duso

Tomaso Duso

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization

Date Written: March 2002

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates contrasting views on the politics of economic policy. Merging different databases, we test various predictions coming form different strands of literature, with the aim of explaining the cross-sectional and temporal variation in the degree of regulatory intervention and entry liberalization in the digital mobile telecommunications industry of OECD countries during the 1990's. We analyze the role of political institutions, government's types and ideological position, industry and consumers' private interests, as well as the regulatory environment in shaping regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that all these sets of variables help to explain some degree of variability in the observed liberalization patterns among countries. Yet, political and regulatory institutions and the pressure of strong incumbent firms are found to be the most important factors.

Keywords: Political Economy, Regulation, Entry Liberalization, Institutions, Ideology, Private Interests, Mobile Telecommunications, OECD

JEL Classification: C23, D72, D78, L5

Suggested Citation

Duso, Tomaso, On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries (March 2002). WZB Discussion Paper No. FS IV 02-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=467302 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.467302

Tomaso Duso (Contact Author)

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstra├če 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization ( email )

Berlin, 10585
Germany

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