When Do Bidders Gain? The Difference in Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets

48 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2003

See all articles by Mara Faccio

Mara Faccio

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business, Purdue University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

David Stolin

Toulouse Business School - Economics and Finance

John J. McConnell

Purdue University

Date Written: February 9, 2004

Abstract

We examine announcement period excess returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets in 17 Western European countries over the interval 1996 through 2001. Acquirers of listed targets earn an insignificant average excess return of -0.38%, while acquirers of unlisted targets earn a significant average excess return of +1.48%. This "listing effect" in acquirers' returns persists through time and across countries and remains after controlling for the method of payment for the target, the acquirer's size and Tobin's Q, pre-announcement leakage of information about the transaction, whether the acquisition created a blockholder in the acquirer's ownership structure, whether the acquisition was a cross-border deal, and other variables. The fundamental factors that give rise to the listing effect, which has also been documented in U.S. acquisitions, remain elusive.

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Stolin, David and McConnell, John J., When Do Bidders Gain? The Difference in Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets (February 9, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=467488 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.467488

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business, Purdue University ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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David Stolin

Toulouse Business School - Economics and Finance ( email )

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France

John J. McConnell

Purdue University ( email )

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