Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey

47 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2003 Last revised: 15 Jul 2022

See all articles by Patrick Bajari

Patrick Bajari

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ali Hortacsu

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

This paper surveys recent studies of Internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, economists have documented strategic bidding in these markets and attempted to understand why sniping, or bidding at the last second, occurs. Second, some researchers have measured distortions from asymmetric information due, for instance, to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation in online auctions. Finally, we discuss what Internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.

Suggested Citation

Bajari, Patrick and Hortacsu, Ali, Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey (November 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w10076, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=467544

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Ali Hortacsu

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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