Workers' Compensation and Injury Duration: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

39 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2007 Last revised: 28 Nov 2012

See all articles by Bruce D. Meyer

Bruce D. Meyer

University of Chicago - Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt University - Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

David L. Durbin

National Council on Compensation Insurance

Date Written: October 1990

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of workers' compensation on the time until an injured worker returns to work. Two large increases in the maximum weekly benefit amount in Kentucky am Michigan are examined. The increases raised the benefit amount for high earnings individuals by over sixty percent, while low earnings individuals, who did not earn enough to be eligible for the old maximum, did not experience a change in their incentives. A comparison of the behavior of pecp1e injured the year before the benefit increases to those injured the year after provides an estimate of the effect of higher benefits on injury duration. This use of a "natural experiment" allows us to separate the effect of the level of the benefits from the effect of previous earnings, which is a common difficulty in the analysis of social insurance programs. The analysis uses individual records from a large number of insurance companies. Time out of work increases dramatically for those groups eligible for the higher benefits, while those whose benefits do not change do not experience a change in duration. The estimates suggest large moral hazard effects of higher benefits, with the estimated elasticity of spell duration with respect to benefits of approximately .3 to .4.

Suggested Citation

Meyer, Bruce D. and Viscusi, W. Kip and Durbin, David L., Workers' Compensation and Injury Duration: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (October 1990). NBER Working Paper No. w3494. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=467655

Bruce D. Meyer (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-2712 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7715 (Phone)
615-322-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )

Nashville, TN 37203
United States

David L. Durbin

National Council on Compensation Insurance

5 Marine View Plaza, 4th Floor
Vice President
Hoboken, NJ 07030-5722
United States
201-222-0500, Ext. 2109 (Phone)
201-222-8880 (Fax)

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