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Structural Holes, CEOs, and the Missing Link in Corporate Governance

81 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2003  

Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Law

Date Written: November 12, 2003

Abstract

Recent studies have questioned the desirability of independent boards. This paper presents and examines two principal hypotheses and four subsidiary hypotheses to explain these results. The two principal hypotheses are:

1. Corporations that have inside boards will have weak CEOs.

2. Corporations that have independent boards will have strong CEOs.

The four subsidiary hypotheses are:

1. Corporations that are hierarchically structured and have inside boards will have weak CEOs.

2. Corporations that are hierarchically structured and have independent boards will have moderately weak CEOs.

3. Corporations that are horizontally structured and have inside boards will have moderately strong CEOs.

4. Corporations that are horizontally structured and have independent boards will have strong CEOs.

The hypotheses are examined through the lens of structural hole theory and recommendations for reform and further research are provided.

Keywords: corporate governance, independent directors, board of directors, structural holes

JEL Classification: G3, K0, K1, K2

Suggested Citation

Wasserman Mitchell, Ezra, Structural Holes, CEOs, and the Missing Link in Corporate Governance (November 12, 2003). GWU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 77. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=467980 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.467980

Ezra Wasserman Mitchell (Contact Author)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Law ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

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