The Private Provision of Public Goods Via Dominant Assurance Contracts

PUBLIC CHOICE

Posted: 25 Feb 1997

See all articles by Alexander T. Tabarrok

Alexander T. Tabarrok

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Many types of public goods can be produced privately by profit-seeking entrepreneurs using a modified form of assurance contract, called a dominant assurance contract. I model the dominant assurance contract as a game and show that the pure strategy equilibrium has agents contributing to the public good as a dominant strategy. The game is also modeled under incomplete information as a Bayesian-Nash game.

JEL Classification: H41, C72

Suggested Citation

Tabarrok, Alexander T., The Private Provision of Public Goods Via Dominant Assurance Contracts. PUBLIC CHOICE. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4682

Alexander T. Tabarrok (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

MSN 1D3
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2314 (Phone)

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