Plural Management

10 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2024

See all articles by Tobin South

Tobin South

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - MIT Media Laboratory

Leon Erichsen

Gitcoin

Shrey Jain

Microsoft Research

Petar Maymounkov

Independent

Scott Moore

Decentralization Research Center

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Date Written: January 9, 2024

Abstract

We introduce Plural Management, a model for partially replacing hierarchical organizational authority with plural mechanisms allowing networked authority. Participants earn influence by anticipating and fulfilling organizational priorities and harness this influence to set priorities and validate contributions, fostering a dynamic, merit-based power structure. This approach, which we illustrate with the example of open-source software development, emphasizes valued contributions and diligence without requiring hierarchical choke points, thereby enhancing participation and allowing adaptive collective intelligence.

Keywords: management, plurality, quadratic mechanisms, open-source, software management, organizational dynamics

Suggested Citation

South, Tobin and Erichsen, Leon and Jain, Shrey and Maymounkov, Petar and Moore, Scott and Weyl, Eric Glen, Plural Management (January 9, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4688040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4688040

Tobin South (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - MIT Media Laboratory ( email )

20 Ames St.
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

Leon Erichsen

Gitcoin

Shrey Jain

Microsoft Research ( email )

Redomond, WA 98052

Petar Maymounkov

Independent ( email )

Scott Moore

Decentralization Research Center ( email )

Eric Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

11 Ellsworth Ave, #2
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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