Does AI Cheapen Talk? Theory and Evidence From Global Entrepreneurship and Hiring

55 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2024 Last revised: 27 Jul 2024

See all articles by Bo Cowgill

Bo Cowgill

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Pablo Hernandez-Lagos

Yeshiva University - Syms School of Business

Nataliya Langburd Wright

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management

Date Written: July 26, 2024

Abstract

Screening human capital based on signals such as job applications or entrepreneurial pitches is crucial for organizations. Signals are informative insofar as they are costly. Generative AI (GAI) complicates screening by lowering the cost of producing impressive signals. We model the informational effects of GAI, showing that applicants' use of GAI can increase-but also decrease-an evaluator's screening mistakes. This result depends on how GAI affects experts' signals compared to non-experts'. Using experiments in hiring and startup investing, we estimate that the adoption of GAI (ChatGPT) lowers employers' and startup investors' screening accuracy by 4-9%. Consistent with our model, we also find that the use of GAI in some settings improves screening accuracy (in our case, non-English-speaking countries). These results show that GAI can profoundly shape screening accuracy.

Keywords: Screening, Artificial Intelligence, Entrepreneurship, Human Capital

JEL Classification: M10, M13, O33

Suggested Citation

Cowgill, Bo and Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo and Wright, Nataliya, Does AI Cheapen Talk? Theory and Evidence From Global Entrepreneurship and Hiring (July 26, 2024). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4702114, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4702114 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4702114

Bo Cowgill

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Pablo Hernandez-Lagos

Yeshiva University - Syms School of Business ( email )

2495 Amsterdam Ave
New York, NY NY 10033
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pablohernandez-lagos.com/

Nataliya Wright (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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