Information Aggregation by Council

29 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2024

See all articles by Nikolas Tsakas

Nikolas Tsakas

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: January 24, 2024

Abstract

We compare the information aggregation efficiency of a small deliberative council to that of a large majority-based electorate in a society of truth-seeking individuals facing a binary collective decision. While the electorate possesses more information than the council, the latter proves to be substantially more effective than the former when information aggregation is a complex task, and only slightly less so when it is a simple/additive endeavour. Our findings offer a novel rationale for the prevalence of representative democracies, favoring small deliberative bodies over large electorates.

Keywords: Information aggregation, strategic voting, council, electorate, deliberation, direct/representative democracy.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Tsakas, Nikolas and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Information Aggregation by Council (January 24, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4705770 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4705770

Nikolas Tsakas (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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