Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach

47 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2003

See all articles by Ilan Noy

Ilan Noy

Victoria University of Wellington

Date Written: October 2003

Abstract

The IMF creates "moral hazard," when it provides bailouts to countries that face a BOP crisis. Two central questions are posed: is moral hazard observable in the data; and, if it is, what is its magnitude? We search for evidence that the unprecedented bailouts of the last decade have changed the investing environment in such a way that international investors started believing that their investments were insured. Our events-study is based on IMF-led events identified as both important and unexpected, such as the bailout loan for Mexico in 1995 and the absence of one for Russia in 1998. Our conclusion is negative: no such change in the moral hazard effect was observed. We demonstrate that events surrounding the out-of-sample Argentinean default (Dec. 2001) support our finding.

Keywords: IMF, Moral hazard, bailouts, sovereign debt

JEL Classification: F33, F34, G14

Suggested Citation

Noy, Ilan, Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach (October 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=470661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.470661

Ilan Noy (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand

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