Plato's Equity Jurisprudence

Abstract

Plato is an unfamiliar starting place from which to investigate classical methods of statutory or constitutional interpretation. Yet, as classical texts come, Plato’s Laws offers a robust account of legislative intent and the role of statutory interpretation in a properly constituted polis. Moreover, it appears that Plato’s account informs Aristotle’s famous commentary on epieikeia in Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. 

First, I examine exactly how Plato grounds proper interpretation in systems with written constitutions, such as Magnesia. This means my descriptive account is mostly relegated to Laws. And this is for good reason. Laws represents an intentional and practical departure from the aspirational components of the Republic. For Plato, equitable interpretation, which is used in particular cases, is a subset of a broader equitable enterprise called Sumplaēroun. Under this doctrine, judicial and legislative practices fill in gaps left by a written constitutional substructure.

Second, I compare Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of equitable interpretation. Aristotle clearly borrowed from Plato’s insights but departs in important respects. The ambiguity in Aristotle's account, furthermore, can be clarified by viewing it in light of Plato’s. Lastly, I lay out further implications of Plato’s theory on contemporary Constitutional theory.

Keywords: statutory interpretation, equitable interpretation, Plato, Aristotle, Plato's Laws