EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 Versus Parliament 6

33 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2003

See all articles by Stefan Napel

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Mika Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: September 2003

Abstract

This Paper analyses bargaining between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) in the Conciliation Committee with the aim of evaluating both institutions' power in the European Union's codecision procedure. In contrast to other studies, which use power indices or simple spatial-voting models, both institutions are assumed to act strategically and differences in their internal decision mechanisms are taken into account. Although the CM and the EP have a seemingly symmetric position in the Conciliation Committee, the analysis highlights that the CM is strongly favoured in terms of its average influence on legislation. EU enlargement under the rules of the Treaty of Nice renders the EP almost irrelevant, while the constitutional proposal put forward by the European Convention can lead to a Pareto-improvement.

Keywords: European Union, bargaining, spatial voting, codecision procedure

Keywords: European Union, bargaining, spatial voting, codecision procedure

JEL Classification: C70, C78, D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Napel, Stefan and Widgren, Mika T., EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 Versus Parliament 6 (September 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4071. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=470881

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Mika T. Widgren (Contact Author)

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

FIN-20500 Turku
Finland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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