A theory of moral authority Moral choices under network externalitites Early draft July 2, 2024., please do not circulate; available as working paper at SSRN

17 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2024 Last revised: 28 May 2024

See all articles by Avner Greif

Avner Greif

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Øivind "Evan" Schøyen

University of Tromsø - The Arctic University of Norway - School of Business and Economics; FAIR Centre, NHH Norwegian School of Economics,

Date Written: January 31, 2024

Abstract

What determines which behavior is considered morally ideal? We present a rational actor model where people's choices determine the contents of moral ideals. The model shows that, if choices reflect a trade-off between cost and the feeling of guilt, social learning cannot sustain moral ideals that mandate privately costly behavior. Persons with the ability to affect what others consider moral-moral authorities-are needed to sustain privately costly moral ideals. We apply the model to analyze what limits the influence of moral authorities' and what determines the enforcement costs of laws.

Keywords: Morality, moral authority, moral unraveling, moral network externalities, moral choices, moral community JEL classification: D02, D10, N30, D71, Z12

JEL Classification: D02, D10, N30, D71, Z12

Suggested Citation

Greif, Avner and Schøyen, Øivind, A theory of moral authority Moral choices under network externalitites Early draft July 2, 2024., please do not circulate; available as working paper at SSRN (January 31, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4712115 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4712115

Avner Greif

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-725-8936 (Phone)

Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )

180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Øivind Schøyen (Contact Author)

University of Tromsø - The Arctic University of Norway - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Norway

FAIR Centre, NHH Norwegian School of Economics, ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

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