Take the Good with the Bad, and the Bad with the Good? An Experiment on Pro-Environmental Compensatory Behaviour

Abstract

To what extent are people subject to moral licensing in the environmental domain? Rather than just examining morallicensing and cleansing at an aggregate level, we investigate experimentally the moral dynamics at a disaggregated level. Using a combination of two symmetric games (i.e. Giving and Taking games with environmental NGOs), we found that aggregate results occult heterogeneity that can be used to improve environmental policy performance. Overall, half of the participants adopts compensatory behaviour. Men are, in general, more consistent than women, however when they adopt licensing, the extent of compensation is far more important than for women. Highly environmentally concerned individuals are more generous than less environmentally concerned individuals, and also compensate more frequently. The framing of the donation game impacts first donations, and moreover impacts the type of inconsistency people might adopt. We suggest that policymakers can improve policy performances by avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all management’ and tailoring their approaches according to this heterogeneity of moral dynamics.

Keywords: cleansing, dictator game, licensing, moral in(consistency), taking game