Regulation and processing costs: Evidence from the hyperlink mandate

54 Pages Posted: 29 Feb 2024 Last revised: 9 May 2024

See all articles by Laura Griffin

Laura Griffin

University of Colorado at Boulder

A. Nicole Skinner

University of Colorado at Boulder

Sarah L. C. Zechman

University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business

Date Written: May 9, 2024

Abstract

Over the last few decades, the SEC has focused on improving the “usability” of financial filings. We examine the SEC’s 2017 hyperlink mandate to evaluate the effectiveness of one such initiative using the Blankespoor et al. (2020) processing cost framework. While the SEC expects links to external exhibits to help investors by reducing acquisition costs, research in other fields indicates the links may increase integration costs by increasing cognitive load. We find little evidence that the mandate affects the market response to 10-Ks, on average. However, post-mandate we observe muted market responses when investors are more constrained and stronger responses when investors benefit most from acquiring additional information. This evidence suggests that, although the mandate is not associated with net processing costs on average, there are predicable processing cost effects in certain circumstances. These findings have implications for academics as well as regulators as they evaluate future mandates.

Keywords: Disclosure processing costs, hyperlinks, SEC regulation, acquisition costs, integration costs

JEL Classification: G10, G14, M40, M41

Suggested Citation

Griffin, Laura and Skinner, Ashley Nicole and Zechman, Sarah L. C., Regulation and processing costs: Evidence from the hyperlink mandate (May 9, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4714246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4714246

Laura Griffin

University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )

256 UCB
Boulder, CO CO 80300-0256
United States

Ashley Nicole Skinner (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )

256 UCB
Boulder, CO CO 80300-0256
United States

Sarah L. C. Zechman

University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business ( email )

Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States

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