Efficient and Inefficient Employment Outcomes: A Study Based on Canadian Data

31 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2007

See all articles by Louis N. Christofides

Louis N. Christofides

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics; University of Guelph; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Andrew J. Oswald

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: March 1991

Abstract

This paper estimates employment equations based on the traditional labour demand model and modern efficient bargain theory using data drawn from wage contracts signed in the Canadian private unionized sector between 1978 and 1984. Contrary to the labour demand model predictions, the alternative wage rate is consistently significant and has the negative coefficient predicted by efficient bargain theory. Though a credible labour demand model can sometimes be estimated, the results are sensitive to the assumed market structure and to the introduction of alternative wage and unemployment insurance variables. Non-nested tests favour efficient bargain specifications.

Suggested Citation

Christofides, Louis N. and Oswald, Andrew J., Efficient and Inefficient Employment Outcomes: A Study Based on Canadian Data (March 1991). NBER Working Paper No. w3648. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=471571

Louis N. Christofides (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus
357 22 892448 (Phone)
357 22 892432 (Fax)

University of Guelph ( email )

Guelph, Ontario
Canada
001-519-763-8497 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Andrew J. Oswald

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
523510 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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