Profiting from Data Commons: Theory, Evidence, and Strategy Implications

Jason Potts, Andrew Torrance, Dietmar Harhoff, Eric von Hippel (2023) Profiting from Data Commons: Theory, Evidence, and Strategy Implications. Strategy Science, Articles in Advance 15 Sep 2023 . https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2021.0080

MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 7061-24

18 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2024

See all articles by Jason Potts

Jason Potts

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technolog (RMIT University)

Andrew W. Torrance

University of Kansas School of Law; MIT Sloan School of Management

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Eric A. von Hippel

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Date Written: September 15, 2023

Abstract

We define data commons as repositories of freely-accessible, “open source” innovation-related data, information and knowledge. Data commons are and can be a significant resource for both innovating and innovation-adopting firms and individuals. First, the availability of free data and information from such commons reduces the innovation-specific private or open investment required to access the data and make the next innovative advance. Second, the fact that the data are freely accessible lowers transactions costs substantially. In this paper, we draw on the theory and empirical evidence regarding innovation commons in general and data commons in particular. Based on these foundations, we consider strategic decisions in the private and public domain: how can individuals, firms and societies profit from data commons? We first discuss the varying nature of and contents of data commons, their functioning, and the value they provide to private innovators and to social welfare. We next explore the several types of data commons extant today, and their mechanisms of action. We find that those who develop innovation-related information at private cost already have, surprisingly often, an economic incentive to freely reveal their information to a data commons. However, we also find and discuss important exceptions. We conclude with suggestions regarding needed innovation research, data commons “engineering”, and innovation policymaking that could together increase private and social welfare via enhancement of data commons.

Note:

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Keywords: diffusion of innovation, ecosystems, market failures, open innovation, patents, intellectual property, technology strategy

Suggested Citation

Potts, Jason and Torrance, Andrew W. and Harhoff, Dietmar and von Hippel, Eric, Profiting from Data Commons: Theory, Evidence, and Strategy Implications (September 15, 2023). Jason Potts, Andrew Torrance, Dietmar Harhoff, Eric von Hippel (2023) Profiting from Data Commons: Theory, Evidence, and Strategy Implications. Strategy Science, Articles in Advance 15 Sep 2023 . https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2021.0080, MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 7061-24, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4718709

Jason Potts

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technolog (RMIT University) ( email )

Andrew W. Torrance (Contact Author)

University of Kansas School of Law ( email )

Green Hall
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MIT Sloan School of Management ( email )

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Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

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Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany
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+49 89 24246 599 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )

Munich, 80539
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Eric Von Hippel

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

E62-455
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-7155 (Phone)
617-253-2660 (Fax)

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