Principles and Content for Downstream Emissions Disclosures

Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper 2024-058

Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 24-050

12 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2024 Last revised: 21 Feb 2024

See all articles by Robert S. Kaplan

Robert S. Kaplan

Harvard Business School

Karthik Ramanna

University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government

Date Written: January 1, 2024

Abstract

In a previous paper, we proposed the E-liability carbon accounting algorithm for companies to measure and subsequently reduce their own and their suppliers’ emissions. Some investors and stakeholders, however, want companies to also be accountable for downstream emissions, those produced by their customers, their customers’ customers, and so on down a value chain. In this paper, we describe the misconception of attempting to have all companies measure and be accountable for downstream emissions. But we also propose how to handle the important exception, when end-use consumers are the culpable party producing the downstream emissions.

The paper uses several consumer-product examples to develop three principles for corporate disclosure of downstream emissions. Principle 1: Only companies whose products are directly used by end-consumers (B2C companies) should be required to disclose downstream emissions. Principle 2: Only B2C companies with products that require energy for consumer use, and for which a reasonable causal link exists between the product’s sourcing and design decisions and the emissions from consumer use, should be subject to downstream disclosure. Principle 3: Since companies have limited influence on consumers’ quantity of use of their products, a B2C company’s downstream disclosures should focus on emissions per unit of consumer use, not on total emissions. The paper concludes by explaining why reports of downstream emissions are “disclosures” not “accounting.”

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Robert S. and Ramanna, Karthik, Principles and Content for Downstream Emissions Disclosures (January 1, 2024). Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper 2024-058, Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 24-050, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4721926

Robert S. Kaplan (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field
Accounting & Control
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6150 (Phone)
617-496-7363 (Fax)

Karthik Ramanna

University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government ( email )

Radcliffe Observatory Quarter
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX2 6GG
United Kingdom

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