Getting in a Bind -Comparing Executive Compensation Regulations in the US and the UK

Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law

University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 5/2024

38 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2024

See all articles by Bobby V. Reddy

Bobby V. Reddy

Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: February 10, 2024

Abstract

Executive compensation is a topical issue on both sides of the Atlantic, with concerns that the pay of managers of US and UK publicly traded companies has spiralled out of control. However, a minority narrative has emerged that a discrepancy in pay levels favoring executives of US over UK companies is leading to corporations shunning the London Stock Exchange and an exodus of talent from the UK to the US. When determining the reasons for cross-border pay variations, regulation is an obvious candidate for blame, but is it the only piece of the puzzle? In this article, US and UK executive compensation regulations are compared, finding that the UK does indeed have a stricter regulatory environment, with, in particular, shareholders being given a binding "say-on-pay" in contrast to a simple advisory vote in the US. The divergence in pay levels between the US and the UK cannot, though, solely be attributed to differences in regulations, and cultural attitudes toward high pay also play a role, together with the general outperformance of the US exchanges in recent years. It is easy to get in a bind over regulations, but with executive compensation, other factors are also at play.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Say On Pay, Dodd-Frank, London Stock Exchange, Capital Markets Reform, Directors' Remuneration

JEL Classification: F66, J33, J38, G18, G38, K22, M12, M52

Suggested Citation

Reddy, Bobby, Getting in a Bind -Comparing Executive Compensation Regulations in the US and the UK (February 10, 2024). Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 5/2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4722367

Bobby Reddy (Contact Author)

Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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